campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s that sought to win over constituencies. Finally, 9/11 mobilized a huge reallocation of resources to U.S. homeland security.

5    Since 2002, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget has increased by over 69 percent to $36.2 billion for the fiscal year 2004 and $40.2 billion for 2005. A little over 60 percent of DHS's budget was spent on counterterrorism programs on U.S soil.[5] These expenditures are small compared to the so-called preemptive actions taken in fighting the "war on terror," including the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to a new report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Congress has provided the Department of Defense (DOD) with about $808 billion in supplemental and annual appropriations since 2001, primarily for military campaigns in support of the Global War on Terrorism.[6] Still other proactive spending involves improving intelligence, tracking terrorist assets, and fostering cooperative linkages with other states.[7]

6    After the September 11 attacks, the United States developed a preemptive national strategy for combating terrorism, which outlined the policy framework for coordinated actions to prevent terrorist attacks against itself, its citizens, its interests, and its friends throughout the world.[8] According to the administration, the 9/11 attacks demonstrated the decreased efficacy of nuclear deterrence. The preemptive strategy assumed that global security entailed redefining the nature of war as follows:

- Crises in the 1990s and 2000s have intensified a trend that started during the Cold War — the shift from war between states to war within states. Many wars and conflicts during and after the Cold War were often between warring parties and non-state actors within national borders.
- Non-state organizations, such as guerrilla groups, terrorist networks, and paramilitaries (unofficial armies especially in Iraq) are increasingly organized along ethnic or religious lines. These actors have reached beyond their national borders. Nowadays, terrorist groups often attack outside the boundaries of their own country, whereas prior to this, most terrorist attacks occurred within countries or sometimes in neighboring countries.
- The primary victims and majority of casualties are now civilians, while military deaths are on the decline. In Iraq for example, it is estimated that more than 30,000 Iraqi civilians have died, well below the 5,000 U.S. soldiers killed in Iraq.[9] At the beginning of the twentieth century, "the ratio of military to civilian victims was about nine to one, while during the Second World War, the ratio was about even. By the end of the century, the ratio had been completely turned upside down as nine civilian deaths occurred for every one military death."[10]

As a result, some scholars believe that the violence and civil conflict in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Liberia, and Rwanda have features that are qualitatively different from previous conflicts.[11]

7    We can make three assumptions about the changing nature of international security. First and foremost is that there is a growing link between transnational terrorism and WMD proliferation, making the potential of a 9/11-like attack using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons likely. Second, there is a growing pessimism about deterrence and its applicability to non-state threats; the argument being that "deterring terrorists" is an oxymoron, and that, in the case of terrorists and WMD, possession guarantees use. Most analysts contend that terrorist groups cannot be deterred that lack populations to protect or territory to safeguard and whose operatives may be willing to die for their objectives. At least, such groups are very difficult to deter given contemporary international standards and political norms, such as the unacceptability of reprisals against innocent civilians.[12] The third assumption is that if deterrence fails, defenses will never be perfect. Despite some defensive tools and measures, such as ballistic missile defense, cruise missile and other air defenses, civil defense, detection, vaccines, port/border checks, and so forth, these measures would not be one hundred percent effective against WMD challenges.[13]

8    The apparent success of nuclear deterrence before 9/11 was conditioned by two major factors:

> It was directed against the *use* of nuclear weapons by *states* possessing such weapons. Nuclear deterrence did not seek to prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons — it sought instead to prevent their use by holding hostage the enemy state's targetable territory, leadership, industry, military forces, and cities. Nuclear deterrence moreover did not have to concern itself with threats posed by non-state actors armed with weapons of mass destruction.[14]

In this case, deterrence means to induce at least one of the enemies not to take a hostile action contrary to the interests of the other by convincing the enemy that doing so would not be worth the effort. Deterrence is an effort to manipulate the enemy's motivation, to challenge the status quo. Yet preemption is based on

[52] Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, "*America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack*," (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Philip B. Heymann, *Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1998); Brad Roberts, ed., *Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses* (Alexandria, Va.: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997); and Jessica Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[53] Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, 77 (November/December 1998):80-94.

[54] Matthew J. Morgan, (2004):30. See Russell D. Howard, "Understanding Al Qaeda's Application of the New Terrorism – The Key to Victory in the Current Campaign," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, ed. by Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer. (Guilford, Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004).

[55] National Commission on Terrorism, *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report of the National Commission on Terrorism* (Washington: GPO, 2000):2.

[56] On 26 November 2008 reports indicated that a large number of people were killed in a series of shootings in Mumbai. Terrorists used automatic weapons and grenades in their attacks, which mostly targeted tourists. Gunmen opened fire on a crowded train station, luxury hotels and restaurants. The several targeted locations included Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus station, Oberoi and Taj Mahal hotels. At least 101 people, including at least six foreign nationals, were confirmed dead, and at least 314 have been injured. All except one of the attacks took place in South Mumbai, at the crowded Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) railway station and at two five-star hotels. See the blog entry on 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks (accessed 29 April 2010). Some of the former terrorist attacks in India include: 18 February 2007, two improvised explosive device (IED) blasts in two coaches of Samjhauta Express, the Delhi-Attari special train for Lahore, at Deewana near Panipat in Haryana. In this terrorist attack, 67 people were killed and 50 injured. 11 July 2006, seven bomb blasts at seven locations in local trains across Mumbai city. In these attacks, 228 people were killed and 890 injured. 6 December 1997, IED blasts in three trains in Chennai, Pandyan Express (Tiruchi), Cheran Express (Erode) and Allepy Express, (Thrissur), 10 people were killed and 150 injured. See the list of Railway Attacks in India from 1999 to 2009 (accessed 29 April 2010).

[57] *Stéphane Leman-Langlois* and Jean-Paul Brodeur, 133-134.

[58] See Jack Patterson, Eliza Kretzmann, and Tom Smith, 73-75.

[59] See Russell D. Howard, 75-76; Also see Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics, vol. 13, no. 4, (July 1981).

[60] Al Qaeda is a wealthy, multi-national organization with very large income streams; it has investments and concealed accounts throughout the world. See Brian Murphy, "The shape of terrorism," *Fayetteville Observer*, Aug. 21, 2002, 95. See also Victor Comras, "Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,"*Strategic Insights*, vol. IV, issue 1 (January 2005).

[61] Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 7. See Edward F. Mickolus, Todd Sandler, and Jean M. Murdock, "International terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events," vol.1 1980-1983, (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1989).

[62] See Matthew J. Morgan. See also Alexander Spencer, "*Questioning the Concept of 'New Terrorism',*" *Peace, Conflict & Development*, issue 8, January 2006 (accessed 29 April 2010; corrected 14 April 2014).